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INTERNATIONAL LAw-ACT OF STATE DOCTmINE-First National
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
International comity demands that one sovereign ordinarily recog-
nize the legitimacy of the acts of another, questioning their validity
under neither internal nor international law. A challenge to the le-
gality of the acts of another nation-state may entail serious interna-
tional repercussions; such challenges thus have been considered grave
matters of national diplomatic policy within the exclusive competency
of the political branches of government. Judicial recognition of this
fact is reflected in the act of state doctrine-the refusal of the courts
of one nation-state to investigate the legality of official governmental
acts performed in another. This doctrine, accepted in varying degrees
by many nations,' had its origin in the United States in Underhill v.
Hernandez.2 Underhill held that the doctrine barred an action in
American courts against the Venezuelan government for wrongful
imprisonment, but the doctrine has been. most commonly utilized in
the area of foreign expropriations.3 In that context; the United States
Supreme Court reexamined the validity and scope of the doctrine
in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.4
First National City, a New York bank, had made a loan to a
Cuban pre-Castro bank, secured by assets in the United States. Subse-
quently, as part of a general plan of nationalization of American-
controlled corporations in Cuba, the Castro government seized
substantial amounts of City Bank's Cuban property. City Bank retal-
iated by declaring the loan to the Cuban bank in default, selling the
collateral and keeping those proceeds in excess of the amount due on
the loan (some $1.8 million) as partial compensation for the expropri-
ation. Banco Nacional de Cuba, successor to the Cuban bank,
brought suit in federal district court to recover the excess on the sale; 5
City Bank counterclaimed for damages resulting from the uncompen-
sated expropriation of its property, asserting seizure of the excess on
1. See generally F. MOONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES (1967).
2. "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
another done within its own territory." 168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897).
3. See generally Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
4. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
5. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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the sale as a set-off against its counterclaim. Banco Nacional asserted
that the act of state doctrine barred inquiry into the legality of the
Cuban government's expropriation, a governmental action which took
place in Cuban territory by a government then existing and recog-
nized by the United States.
Concluding that the Hickenlooper Amendment 6 had overruled the
act of state doctrine in this factual context, the district court granted
summary judgment for City Bank after the bank waived recovery on
its counterclaim in excess of the amount obtained from foreclosing the
collateral. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the Hickenlooper
amendment did not apply, and that the counterclaim was therefore
barred in toto by the act of state doctrine. 7 After the Supreme Court
had granted certiorari,8 it received a letter from the State Department
indicating that the Executive had no objection to the Court's ignoring
the act of state doctrine and deciding the case on its merits. The Court
remanded the case for reconsideration in view of the State Depart-
ment's letter.9 The Second Circuit adhered to its earlier decision, 10
and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari. I I
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White,
concluded that the State Department letter was determinative and that
the act of state doctrine therefore was no bar to the counterclaim. 12
Justice Douglas concurred in the result,' 3 but relied on National City
Bank of New York v. Republic of China,14 which held that a sover-
6. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e) (2) (1970):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign
state [or a party claiming through such state] based upon [or traced through] a
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in viola-
tion of the principles of international law ....
Also referred to as the Sabbatino Amendment, since it was enacted in 1964 in response
to the decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See, e.g.,
the letter from the State Department, reproduced in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First
National City Bank of New York, 442 F.2d 530. 536 n.3 (2d Cir. 1971).
7. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394. 404 (2d Cir.
1970).
8. 400 U.S. 1019(1971).
9. Id.
10. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank. 442 F.2d 530, 536
(2d Cir. 1971).
II. 404U.S.820(1971).
12. 406 U.S. 759, 767-70(1972).
13. Id. at 770-73.
14. 348 U.S. 356(1955).
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eign who voluntarily brings an action in a United States court waives
sovereign immunity as to a permissive counterclaim to the extent of
the set-off. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, concluding that
the lower court should have examined the validity of the expropria-
tion under standards of international law.15
Justice Brennan in dissent, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and
Blackmun, argued that the State Department letter was irrelevant; he
would have affirmed the Second Circuit's decision that the act of state
doctrine barred inquiry into the validity of the expropriation. 16 The
Second Circuit's decision was therefore reversed, five to four.17
Because the three majority opinions sharply diverge in their reason-
ing, while the four dissenting justices firmly oppose allowing the exec-
utive branch to "waive" application of the act of state doctrine, City
Bank seems to leave the future of that doctrine very unsettled. None
of the four opinions seems well founded in logic or constitutional doc-
trine;, none seems likely to result in desirable foreign or domestic
policy. This note suggests a proposed legislative solution which would
remove sensitive decisions on the legality of foreign expropriations
from the courts and place them within the purview of an executive
branch tribunal.
I. CITY BANK: A STUDY IN DOCTRINAL CONFUSION
Regrettably, the Court has never clearly articulated a rational foun-
dation for the act of state doctrine. This failure to specify the basis of
its reasoning has caused much of the confusion and uncertainty which
surround the doctrine's application. Early cases found it based on
15. 406 U.S. at 773-76.
16. Id. at776-96.
17. On remand, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for City
Bank on the counter claim, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973). Instructed by the Supreme
Court to disregard the act of state doctrine and decide the merits of Banco Nacional's
other defenses, the court of appeals held that Banco Nacional was the "alter ego" of the
Cuban government, at least within the context of the nationalization and of this court
action. The court of appeals refused to reexamine the legality of Cuba's nationalization
program under international law. The Second Circuit had held previously:
Since the Cuban decree [s] of expropriation not only [fail] to provide adequate
compensation but also [involve] a retaliatory purpose and a discrimination
against United States nationals... [such decrees are] in violation of international
law.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 868 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166,
183 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
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concepts of international comity 18 and the principle of international
law that each state is sovereign within its own borders. 19 In rejecting
these traditional grounds in the former leading act of state doctrine
case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,20 the Court indicated
that the inherent nature of sovereign authority and international law
were mere guides as to the wisdom of employing the act of state doc-
trine. The Court did not fashion a new rationale for the doctrine,
however. It stated rather vaguely that although the doctrine was not
required by the text of the Constitution, it did have constitutional
underpinnings in the principle of separation of powers. 2'
In City Bank Justice Rehnquist concluded that the act of state doc-
trine is not constitutionally compelled; although he found a basis for
the doctrine in comity among independent sovereigns and among the
respective branches of the federal government, he concluded that the
doctrine is grounded rather on a judicial apprehension that applying
customary principles of law to foreign sovereigns might frustrate the
conduct of foreign relations by the political branches.22
The line of cases from this Court establishing the act of state doctrine
justifies its existence primarily on the basis that juridical review of acts
of state of a foreign power could embarrass the conduct of foreign re-
lations by the political branches of the government.
18. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
19. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
20. 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
21. Id. at 423.
22. 406 U.S. at 765. He observed that the doctrine did not have its roots in the Con-
stitution. Id. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423:
The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine: it does not
irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign
acts of state. The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" under-
pinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in
a system of separation of powers.
Justice Rehnquist was no clearer than the Sabbatino court in his conclusion that the
doctrine was based not on the constitution but on a comity between nations that is "'but-
tressed" by judicial deference to the exclusive power of the Executive over foreign rela-
tions. Though both formulations are ambiguous, Justice Rehnquist's formulation ap-
pears fundamentally different from that of the eight-justice majority in Sabbatino. He
seemed to return to the former rationale of international comity and reinforce this ra-
tionale with a concept of judicial deference to the Executive not found in any former
case. He failed to explain why the concepts of separation of powers or exclusive execu-
tive control over foreign relations would ever allow judicial action in the realm of for-
eign relations, or why the Executive rather than the judiciary should be the branch of
government to determine what judicial acts would interfere with the power to conduct
foreign relations.
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The Executive's statement that a judicial decision on the merits would
not embarrass the conduct of foreign relations, however, removed the
reason for the rule. In so concluding, Justice Rehnquist adopted the
"Bernstein exception," a much-mooted exception to the doctrine
which arose from the decision of a lower court concluding that a State
Department letter purporting to relieve the courts of any restrictions
in judging the validity of Nazi expropriations rendered the act of state
doctrine inapplicable in cases involving those expropriations.23 He dis-
tinguished Sabbatino24 on the grounds that there the State Department
had not sent a Bernstein letter and supported his conclusion by anal-
ogizing to sovereign immunity cases which had long recognized that
the Executive has sole authority to grant or deny immunity to other
sovereigns.25
From a doctrinal standpoint, Justice Rehnquist's opinion is not com-
pletely persuasive. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,26 a lower court decision, can clearly be
distinguished: In Bernstein, for example, the expropriating govern-
ment no longer existed when the suit was brought; in City Bank it did.
Therefore, deciding the case in Bernstein could have had no adverse
effects on relations with a foreign government. Also, the acts com-
plained of in Bernstein occurred while the United States was at war
with the expropriating government. Furthermore, the Executive's at-
tempt to avoid American sanction of official Nazi governmental acts
was but one expression of a long standing United States policy and
international consensus, acceptance of which transcended the par-
ticular issue before the court; hearing the case, therefore, did not
23. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), Bernstein sued to recover property that had been taken
forcibly from him by the Nazi government and conveyed to the defendant's predecessor.
The State Department released a letter indicating that it had been a long-standing policy
of the United States not to recognize Nazi expropriations, and stating that it was the
government's policy to waive the act of state doctrine in judging the validity of such
expropriations. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court for trial. Be-
fore City Bank, the Supreme Court had never ruled on the exception. See generally
Note, Executive Suggestion and the Act of State Cases: Implications of the Stevenson
Letter in the Citibank Case, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 557 (197 1).
24. 376U.S. 398 (1964).
25. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145-46
(1812), in which ChiefJustice Marshall found such immunity to be an implied limitation
to the otherwise complete territorial sovereignty of a nation, a limitation which might be
destroyed only by the express will of the sovereign. Paraphrases by Justice Rehnquist,
406 U.S. at 762.
26. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
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politicize the judiciary. In short, application of the Bernstein exception
in City Bank was not compelled by precedent; Justice Rehnquist's
opinion represents an extension, not an application of prior law.
Nor does this adoption of the Bernstein exception by the Court
appear warranted by the logic of precedents. Past decisions applying
the act of state doctrine did not indicate that its application should
depend on executive prerogative. In its first application of the doc-
trine, the Court indicated it was applying an absolute, judicially-
created rule.2 7 In Sabbatino, the Solicitor General expressed the
opinion as amicus curiae that the Bernstein exception should not be
applied since the government had taken no position in the case, and in
that case the Court merely refused to regard as determinative execu-
tive failure to interpose affirmatively the doctrine. Justice Rehnquist's
attempt to distinguish Sabbatino by arguing that an affirmative execu-
tive waiver of the doctrine is decisive while neutrality is not2 8 seems to
emphasize the strict holding of Sabbatino but ignore the clear implica-
tions of that case.29
Although the Court expressly refused to decide the Berstein ques-
tion in Sabbatino, its reasoning in that case seems inconsistent with
the view that application of the act of state doctrine depends on exec-
utive option.30 The Court in Sabbatino said that the doctrine "ex-
presses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in
the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder
rather than further this country's pursuit of goals . . . .,,3 The Court
rejected the notion that the Executive could accurately predict when
judicial involvement would not be embarrassing:32
27. See note 2 supra.
28. [A] ny exception to the act of state doctrine based on a mere silence or neu-
trality on the part of the Executive might well lead to a conflict between the Execu-
tive and Judicial Branches. Here, however, the Executive Branch has expressly
stated that an inflexible application of the act of state doctrine by this Court
would not serve the interests of American foreign policy.
City Bank, 406 U.S. at 767.
29. Cf. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1967), in which the Justice Depart-
ment argued as amicus curiae that application of the Oregon escheat statute to heirs in
Communist Bloc countries would not unduly interfere with the Executive's conduct of
foreign affairs. The Court refused to accept this statement as determinative and held
that the statute as applied constituted such an intrusion into foreign policy.
30. See generally Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Ab-
stention? 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972).
31. 376. U.S. at 423 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 433.
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Even if the [Court] avoided [determining difficult questions of inter-
national law], either by presuming the validity of an act of state when-
ever the international law standard was thought unclear or by fol-
lowing the State Department declaration in such a situation, the very
expression of jucicial uncertainty might provide embarrassment to the
Executive Branch.
The Court enumerated three factors to be considered when de-
ciding whether application of the act of state doctrine is appropriate:33
(1) The extent to which an international law codification or consensus
exists regarding the legality of the particular act in issue; (2) how
sharply the allegedly invalid acts touch on the state's national interests
and (3) whether the foreign government exists at the time the action is
brought to trial. A balancing of interests such as these has tradition-
ally been a judicial task, and it seems clear that was what the Sabba-
tino Court intended. Finally, speaking more directly to the point, the
Court concluded:3 4
It is highly questionable whether the examination of validity by the
judiciary should depend on an educated guess by the Executive as to
the probable result and, at any rate, should a prediction be wrong, the
Executive might be embarrassed in its dealings with other countries.
Thus, in past cases the Court has regarded the act of state doctrine
as a judicial device and has been disinclined to adopt the Bernstein
exception. Furthermore, because of the sensitive nature of such cases,
they quite possibly should be characterized as political questions.
Executive consent cannot make a political question justiciable.35 Al-
though the political branches are supreme in foreign relations, that
supremacy does not compel judicial deference in such cases.
Justice Rehnquist's view probably will not prevail: it lacks persu-
asive support in past cases, fails to articulate a clearly logical founda-
tion and had the opposition of six justices who concluded that the
Bernstein exception should be rejected.
Justice Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, rejected the Bern-
stein exception but concluded that unless the court determined that its
hearing the case would interfere with delicate foreign relations con-
33. Id. at 427-28.
34. Id. at 436.
35. Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
219
Washington Law Review
ducted by the political branches, it would have an obligation to render
a decision in accordance with standards of international law. 36 He
found no judicial conflict with the foreign relations power in this case
and thus would have remanded. His view, too, is unlikely to prevail
in future cases. Although he attempted to distinguish Sabbatino by
showing that the Court in that case did not purport to lay down an
inflexible rule, he offered no explanation of how Sabbatino's bal-
ancing test, fairly applied in City Bank, would have indicated any
different result. He obviously disagreed, however, with the Sabattino
holding itself; in fact, he candidly admitted that, had he been on the
Sabbatino Court, he would have joined Justice White's dissent. An
earlier case, moreover, had specifically rejected Justice Powell's sug-
gested deference to international law, 37 as did portions of Sabbatino.38
His opinion attracted no support from other members of the Court,
gave at most token support to stare decisis, provided no indication of
how courts might determine applicable international law and therefore
should not be relied on as indicating a future trend which the Court
might follow.
Justice Douglas also rejected the Bernstein exception in a separate
concurring opinion. He concluded that the case should be heard on its
merits because the Cuban government had voluntarily entered an
American court as a plaintiff, and "fair dealing" required that the
counterclaim be allowed to the extent of Cuba's claim. 39 This rea-
soning is unpersuasive; the rationale of a voluntary entry as a consent
to suit traditionally has been a basis for conferring jurisdiction on a
court, not for waiving the act of state doctrine as a defense to a coun-
terclaim. 40 Justice Douglas relied on the Republic of China case,41 but
36. For a general discussion of the policy of deciding cases by international law
standards, see R. FAULK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER ch. 5 (1964).
37. In Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937), the Court stated:
The question is not here whether the proceeding was so conducted as to be a
wrong to our nationals under the doctrines of international law. though valid under
the law of the situs of the land. For wrongs of that order the remedy to be followed
is along the channels of diplomacy.
38. "[T] he public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which in theory is
wronged how to treat that wrong within its own borders." 376 U.S. at 423. The Sabba-
tino Court stated that the act of state doctrine is applicable even if international law is
violated. Id. at 428.
39. 406 U.S. at 772.
40. Id. at 773-74 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
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that case decided only that a foreign nation waived sovereign im-
munity when it brought a claim in United States courts. A sovereign
state which seeks a remedy under American law expects application of
the act of state doctrine as a part of that law. The state, therefore,
should not be deemed to have consented to a waiver of that doctrine.
Moreover, in Sabbatino, as in City Bank, Cuba was the plaintiff; the
Court specifically denied in that case that the state's status as plaintiff
was relevant to application of the act of state doctrine. 42 Furthermore,
Justice Douglas relied on an especially ambiguous basis for the doc-
trine: "fair dealing." The uncertainty inherent in this foundation
makes legal analysis and prediction most difficult-a further reason
for not following his opinion in future cases.
The fragmented state of the majority leaves the act of state doc-
trine in confusion. The doctrine does not apply when the Executive
indicates that it should not (Rehnquist, Burger and White), when the
foreign sovereign is the plaintiff (Douglas) and when the judiciary
decides that a hearing would not interfere with delicate foreign re-
lations (Powell). Because the other four justices held that the doc-
trine is applicable in any event, if any of these three ingredients is
lacking, a majority of the Court would hold that the act of state doc-
trine applies. Under this analysis, City Bank's holding seems restricted
almost to its facts.43
II. POLICY OBJECTIONS TO A HEARING
ON THE MERITS
Although each of the three majority opinions agreeing to a remand
sustains serious doctrinal objections, policy reasons for rejecting a
decision on the merits are even more compelling.
A primary objection to a hearing on the merits in this case is that a
decision against Banco Nacional on the counterclaim would be prej-
udicial to the interests of other American claimants against Cuba.
City Bank had a security interest in the collateral which it quite
legitimately foreclosed when the loan was not paid. However, City
Bank had no secured interest beyond the value of the loan; it had no
42. 376 U.S. at 437.
43. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 461 F.2d 1261 n.l.
(1972).
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more claim to the excess collateral than did any of the numerous other
claimants against the Cuban government. City Bank's recovery
would give City Bank a preference over other legitimate American
claimants merely because of its fortuitous possession of the excess
collateral. This preference would frustrate Congress's intent with
respect to international claims, as expressed in the Act establishing
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, that small claimants
should have priority to any lump sum dispositions by the Commission. 44
Congress' intent would be furthered if the Court had held that the act
of state doctrine barred the counterclaim. In that event, the funds in
issue (those in excess of the amount of City Bank's loan) would not
have reverted to Cuba; the Trading with the Enemy Act would have
required that they be turned over to the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission for apportionment to creditors. 45
Past applications of the act of state doctrine raised complaints that
such refusals to decide issues over which the courts had jurisdiction
had the effect of legitimizing wrongful acts committed against United
States citizens and their property, thereby encouraging expropriations
by foreign states. Moral outrage was expressed that an American cit-
izen should have to watch helplessly while his expropriated property
might come and go and be bought and sold with impunity in this
country. In the Trading with the Enemy Act, however, Congress has
provided an adequate and just remedy outside the courts. Therefore,
the argument that application of the act of state doctrine would pro-
mote a thieves' market is unfounded in this case.46
44. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1627(c), (e) (1970). The Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission was established by the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.22 U.S.C. §§
1621-27 (1970). Cuban claims are assigned to the Commission by 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a)
(1970). It should be observed that Congress chose not to authorize payment of Cuban
claims; the claims are adjudicated and the result certified, payment to await a settlement
with the Cuban government. See 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970); cf. 22 U.S.C. § 1627(c)
( 1970).See generally Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Its Functions and
Jurisdiction, 60 MicH. L. REV. 1079 (1962); Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission and the Cuban Claims Program, I INT'L LAW. 81 (1966).
45. See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 5(b)(1), 6 & 7(c) (1970).
The Executive has continuing powers under the Trading with the Enemy Act by
virtue of a proclamation on December 16, 1950, declaring a state of national emer-
gency. Presidential Proclamation 2914, 64 Stat. A454 (1950). See Sardino v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1966); 42 Op. A-rT'y GEN.
(1968).
46. See generally Comment, The State Department's Role in the Judicial Admnin-
istration ofthe Act of State Doctrine, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (1972).
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Moreover, the dissent's argument that the rationale of City Bank
will entangle the Court in political decisions has some validity. It
seems likely that the Executive will consider political consequences in
deciding whether to allow the judiciary to hear a case and decisions
based on these considerations will vary with changes in administra-
tions. 47 Furthermore, the Court's inability to articulate in concrete
terms the rationale of the act of state doctrine will make it especially
easy to decide a case on the basis of its owh view of the political
merits of the controversy. It seems incongruous that the judiciary may
be turned on and off for political reasons by a statement from the
State Department in the name of separation of powers.
The practical impact of City Bank is lessened, however, by the fact
that Sabbatino and prior cases had indicated that the act of state doc-
trine has many at least arguable exceptions. Support exists in varying
degrees for assertions that the doctrine should not apply when (1) the
foreign state is at war with the United States,48 (2) the foreign state is
not recognized by the United States,49 (3) the suit is brought to en-
force a foreign state's penal or revenue laws,50 (4) the act was not per-
formed within the territory of the foreign state,5 1 (5) the foreign gov-
ernment is not in existence at the time of suit,52 (6) the act was not
fully executed,53 (7) the act is illegal under the law of the foreign state,54
(8) a treaty or other unambiguous agreement covers the contro-
versy55 or (9) there is a "clear" violation of international law.56
47. In Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the State De-
partment had been invited to submit a Bernstein-type letter, and had declined to do
so. The difference might well have been because of the change in administrations;
nonetheless, the State Department's differing treatment of the similar cases is unex-
plained. See also Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Jtdicial Deference or A bstention?,
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 93 (1972).
48. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410.
49. Id. at 410 (distinguished from a simple breaking of diplomatic relations).
But see authors cited id. at 411 n. 12.
50. Jd. at 414.
51. Id. at 413,424-25, 428.
52. See City Bank, 406 U.S. at 788-89 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 414 (inferred from negative implication).
54. See Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1833); accord,
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1972) (dicta).
The weight of authority, however, is decidedly contra. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
415 n.17.
55. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (negative implication).
56. Possible implication from Sabbatino, id. at 430 n.34. But see City Bank, 406
U.S. at 784-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In addition to these many judicial exceptions to the doctrine, Con-
gress has created its own major exception, the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment, which provides that the courts shall not decline to decide the
merits of a case because of the act of state doctrine "in a case in which
a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party...
based upon [or traced through] a confiscation or other taking after
January 1, 1959." 57 The Amendment further requires that the court
evaluate the expropriation under rules of international law. The Court
of Appeals in City Bank construed the Amendment to apply only
"when some other entity attempted to market the American firms'
expropriated property and some aspect of such an attempted transac-
tion took place in this country." 58 Since the property in issue in City
Bank had never been outside the United States, and had never, there-
fore, been expropriated by a foreign government, the Hickenlooper
Amendment did not apply.5 9 The applicability of the Amendment was
not questioned on appeal to the Supreme Court.
Very little then remains of the act of state doctrine in the expropria-
tion context. Numerous judicially-created exceptions have narrowed
the opportunities for the doctrine's use, and the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment has prohibited its application to goods expropriated in foreign
countries and subsequently brought into the United States. City Bank
now has limited the use of the doctrine still further by concluding that
it may not be applied to bar seizures of a foreign government's prop-
erty found in the United States when the foreign state sues as plaintiff,
when the judiciary determines that a judicial decision would not inter-
fere with foreign relations and when the Executive sends a Bernstein
letter.60 This renders the number of cases still subject to application of
57. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), supra note 6.
58. 431 F.2d at 402.
59. Id. The court there stated:
We cannot believe that through the same language Congress intended to create
a self-help seizure remedy for those few American firms fortunate enough to
hold or have access to some assets of a foreign state at the time that state
nationalizes American property.
See also id. n. 14.
60. Even if the act of state doctrine bars the suit in court, the foreign gov-
ernment property may still be seized by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
The act of state doctrine has also been used to bar tort actions by United States citi-
zens allegedly wronged by official foreign governmental action. See United States v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where an American sued for wrongful imprisonment.
That field has not been an important one in the doctrine's application and is unlikely to
become so.
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the act of state doctrine so small that its ambiguities might seem best
cured by allowing the doctrine to die of disuse. However, the Court's
recent extensive discussion of the doctrine in Sabbatino and City Bank
gives it a prominence which probably precludes such a solution, and
so other approaches to clarifying the scope of its application must be
examined.
III. SUGGESTED FUTURE APPROACHES
One possible approach would be to accept the position of the dis-
sent that the Court should determine the contours of the foreign rela-
tions power, that the Bernstein exception should be rejected because it
results in judicial subservience to the other branches in violation of
separation of powers concepts and that the positions of Justices
Powell and Douglas are inconsistent with prior cases. In adhering to
the reasoning of Sabbatino, the dissent has more doctrinal persuasive-
ness than do the positions of the other opinions and preserves the
spirit of stare decisis. Furthermore, the dissent commands the support
of the greatest number of justices. The dissent's opinion fails, how-
ever, to reach beyond a doctrinaire adherence to Sabbatino in dealing
with the underlying problems. It adheres to Sabbatino's "constitu-
tional underpinnings" basis and thereby accepts the same weak doc-
trinal foundation. It fails to explain what component of the "constitu-
tional underpinnings" is federal common law, to what extent, if at all,
use of the doctrine is constitutionally required and by what authority
the judiciary may decide a case by use of a doctrine based on a sepa-
ration of powers analysis without that decision being constitutionally
compelled.61 Because of this uncertainty, the dissent's position fails to
articulate a policy whereby courts can predict future cases.
A second possible judicial solution would be to conclude that the
doctrine is founded in the constitutional requirement of separation of
powers. This solution would provide a concrete basis for the doctrine.
Courts could then analyze cases to determine whether adjudication
61. This paradox recalls the Court's use of the political question doctrine, similarly
based on the separation of powers. Controversy has raged over whether this doctrine is
constitutionally compelled or merely expresses a deferential policy of the Court in light
of the separation of powers. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) with A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962).
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would infringe on the foreign relations power of the political
branches. The courts have some expertise in deciding such questions,
and they could be expected to provide more manageable and predict-
able guidelines. Since this determination would be a constitutional
question to be decided by the Court, it would not involve the Bern-
stein exception.
Acceptance of this constitutional foundation should be accompa-
nied in practice by an almost automatic judicial application of the act
of state doctrine as a matter of judicial policy. Such a policy would
enable appropriate cases to be handled by the Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission, which is a more specialized, expert and flexible
body than a court. This solution might seem a first glance to conflict
with the spirit, although not the letter, of the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment.62 The Amendment requires that the act of state doctrine not be
applied when property expropriated from American citizens is
brought within the jurisdiction of the United States courts and its title
contested; this proposal, on the other hand, would state that the doc-
trine must be applied in situations not covered by the Amendment
where a foreign state's creditors seize its American assets, as in City
Bank. This apparent conflict between legislative intent and proposed
judicial policy, however, is largely illusory. Property covered by the
Hickenlooper Amendment usually has passed into private hands by the
time it is brought into the United States and thus is not subject to sei-
zure without compensation under the Trading with the Enemy Act;63
court action is the injured party's only remedy, and the Amendment
protects him by blocking application of the act of state doctrine.
62. If the act of state doctrine were based on a constitutional foundation, the Hick-
enlooper Amendment might appear to be an unconstitutional order by Congress that the
courts should adjudicate non-judiciable cases. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346 (1911). But the Hickenlooper Amendment is itself an instrument of foreign policy.
announcing Congress' intention that, in a defined group of cases, American courts will
examine the legality of foreign actions. Since this policy is applied in all cases coming
under it rather than on an ad hoc basis, the courts do not interfere with foreign policy
but act in pursuance of it. Cf. City Bank, 406 U.S. at 788 n. 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(a) (1970) concerning claim by a non-enemy for compen-
sation of seized property. See United States v. Broverman, 180 F. Supp. 631. 635
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), which raises the fifth amendment question of the "taking of property of
friendly aliens without just compensation." The Broverman court mentioned the possible
constitutional problem but stated that its ruling avoided the constitutional question. The
following cases were cited as ones in which the fifth amendment "taking" question was
discussed, id. at 635 n.11: Guessefeld v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308. 318 (1952); Russian
Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
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Court action in these cases should not interfere with broad-scale nego-
tiations, consistent with the proposal here, since it would normally
occur infrequently and normally affect private owners rather than for-
eign states directly. Assets owned by the expropriating government, on
the other hand, such as the excess collateral in City Bank, are subject
to seizure under the Trading with the Enemy Act, and to eventual al-
location to parties with cerified claims.64 Although this procedure is
applicable only to property belonging to "enemy" states,65 any state
may be so designated at the discretion of the President. 66 Leaving
such decisions to executive officers and tribunals would give the exec-
utive branch both leverage and flexibility in dealing with a foreign
power. Under this proposal, independent and piecemeal remedies by
courts could not interfere with the broad-scale negotiations conducted
by the political branches.
A third possible approach to defining the scope of the act of state
doctrine would be for Congress to legislate on the subject.67 One ef-
fort in this direction was the Iickenlooper Amendment, the constitu-
tionality of which was upheld in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr.68
In that case, the Second Circuit concluded that the Amendment did
not violate due process since new liabilities were not created; the act
of state doctrine, in the court's view, was merely a judicial policy of
abstention analogous to a statute of limitation. 69 The Farr court fur-
ther concluded that the Amendment was not an improper legislative
interference with the judicial power.70 Under the Amendment the
64. See notes 44 and 45 supra.
65. Only seized property belonging to an enemy or ally of an enemy may be distrib-
uted to creditors. 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 6, 7(c) (1970).
66. 50 U.S.c. APP. § 2(c) (1970).
67. A detailed analysis of legislative-executive conflicts and other possible constitu-
tional issues engendered by congressional action in this area is beyond the scope of this
note.
68. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
69. 383 F.2d at 179.
70. [A] s the Constitution did not require the exact result reached there, the Court
must have exercised its discretion, based on its own judgment of the situation, to
choose from among a number of constitutionally permissible alternative rules as to
the applicability of the act of state doctrine. Therefore the political branches of our
national government should be able to modify the Court's decision, choosing
another constitutionally permissible alternative ... especially as the factor
upon which the choice is based, the effect on our foreign relations, is admittedly
more within the competence of the political branches of the government than the
competence of the Court.
Id. at 181. "Thus a total prohibition upon the courts, declaring that they might never
227
Washington Law Review
Executive was required to act in order to allow, rather than to pre-
vent, application of the doctrine, and therefore the Hickenlooper
Amendment had only modified the doctrine by effecting a reversal of
presumptions. 71 Furthermore, since the Court had characterized the
doctrine as not constitutionally compelled, but only having constitu-
tional underpinnings, Congress had not attempted to force the Court
to adjudicate nonjusticiable questions.7 2
Thus, Farr indicates that Congress has some power to shape the act
of state doctrine. One comentator has reached the same conclusion: 73
Under the power 'to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States,' Congress has no less authority over foreign
commerce than it has over interstate commerce .. . . [U] nder the
commerce power Congress can reach all interstate or foreign 'inter-
course'; it can reach matters precedent to or subsequent to interstate or
foreign commerce.
This approach to shaping the act of state doctrine would probably
be best since legislative action could better integrate application of the
doctrine within the framework of existing statutory programs, such as
that establishing the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and the
certainty of a legislative solution may discourage expropriation by
foreign states.
In devising a legislative approach, one should begin with the ob-
servation that the act of state doctrine has at present a very restricted
scope and that under any scheme it would probably be infrequently
applied.74 However, if expropriations of United States property in for-
eign nations should continue to increase, such a doctrine might as-
sume much greater importance. A desirable congressional scheme
would strive to (1) avoid conflicts among the three branches of gov-
resort to the act of state doctrine, might well be unconstitutional as violative of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine." Id. But see note 62 supra for a proposed answer to this
objection.
Although it did not decide the question, the court did indicate that there might be con-
stitutional limitations on Congress' power to completely abolish the doctrine.
71. Id.
72. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
73. Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 915 (1957). "The power of Congress
over foreign commerce would then, of itself, support legislation equivalent to a large
part of the law 'enacted' by treaty." Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Fed-
eral Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 821 (1964).
74. See text accompanying note 60 stupra.
228
Vol. 49: 213, 1973
Act of State Doctrine
ernment, (2) provide a uniform scheme integrated with present con-
gressional programs, (3) provide flexibility and leverage in the execu-
tive and legislative branches to enable them to deal forcefully and
effectively with foreign governments, (4) insure adequate protection of
the interests of American citizens, (5) provide a forum with expertise in
resolving the special issues involved and (6) avoid unnecessary insults
to the governmental integrity of other nations.
One solution which would meet most of these criteria would be for
Congress to provide that the act of state doctrine be applied across the
board in every situation. This would of course eliminate the Bernstein
exception and would require a repeal of the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment. In place of the Hickenlooper Amendment, Congress could de-
clare property expropriated by "enemy"7 5 governments to be contra-
band, prohibit its import into the United States and seize any property
subsequently imported.76
This solution would not deprive the Judicial Branch of much juris-
diction, since application of the act of state doctrine had been the rule
rather than the exception prior to passage of the Hickenlooper
Amendment and last Term's decision in City Bank. The Second Cir-
cuit concluded that the Hickenlooper Amendment was constitutional
since it only effected a "reversal of presumptions;" to require applica-
tion of the doctrine in all cases should even more clearly be constitu-
tional, since it makes conclusive the presumption of the doctrine's
applicability. 77 Such a step would be consistent with separation of
power concepts (criterion 1), since it would prevent the courts from
dealing in foreign relations and political questions. By removing the
possibility of a Bernstein exception, it would insure that the courts
would not become an "errand boy of the Executive, '7 8 thus furthering
separation of power objectives. By providing a single forum, it would
eliminate the overlaps, conflicts and inconsistencies presently existing
between the respective jurisdictions of the courts and of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (criterion 2) and thereby would better
utilize and develop the expertise of the Commission (criterion 5).
75. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
76. By making importation of such property unlawful, its seizure could be justi-
fied as a penal measure, thus escaping invalidation as an uncompensated taking. Cf.
note 63 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 70 & 71 supra. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 440 (1850); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
78. City Bank, 406 U.S. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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In addition, this legislative solution would enable the Executive to
deal more effectively with expropriating nations (criteria 3 and 4).
The expropriating government's market for its expropriated goods
could be impaired if those goods were subject to seizure as contraband
in the United States regardless of ownership at the time seized. This
remedy could be extended to provide affirmative action against any
property whose title was obtained from an expropriating nation. Of
course these are drastic remedies which could have a significant im-
pact on innocent parties and governments. They might, however, put
the United States into a more favorable bargaining position with ex-
propriating nations. Presumably, abuses could be controlled by de-
vising adequate standards for the utilization of this machinery and by
the exercise of responsible restraint by Congress and the Executive.
The fact that such standards and machinery would make a remedy
readily available would clarify the position of claimants and possibly
would act as a deterrent to foreign expropriations.
Jack E. Sands
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